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Bankability at a common 8%

This page walks the headline cohort. To filter and rank every bankability-complete asset (after-tax on common 8%; pre-tax and PEA-grade in their own segregated tiers), use the all-asset Screener ›

Issuer feasibility NPVs are reported at different discount rates (5%, 7%, 8%, 10%), so they cannot be compared as published. This view normalises them to one 8% real post-tax basis. Where an issuer already reported at 8%, the figure is Sourced as-is; where re-discounted, it is Derived and labelled.

Read the price deck. Normalisation here adjusts the discount rate only, not the commodity-price assumption. The Côte d'Ivoire gold cohort (Koné, Doropo, Assafou) is re-discounted from issuer NPV₅ but sits at different gold-price decks ($1,850–$3,000/oz, shown per row) — these rows are re-discounted to 8% and are NOT price-comparable (a common gold deck is a roadmap item). Doropo's 8% comes from the issuer's OWN published discount-rate table; Koné and Assafou use a level-annuity proxy that — as Doropo's table reveals — overstates NPV₈ by ~6% for pre-production assets (the build lag pushes cash flows later), so those two read as upper bounds. Côte d'Ivoire also moved to a 5–8% sliding gold royalty reaching 8% above $2,000/oz, backdated to Jan 2025 (2025 Finance Law, ~+2 points on the prior 3–6% bands), so each gold row carries a fiscal flag noting whether its DFS predates or incorporates the change. This is the inputs to run your own deck — not a single comparable number.

AssetIssuer NPV (as reported)NPV at common 8%Basis / caveat
Goulamina
Mali · Li
US$2,946m
@ 8%
US$2,946m issuer 8%Already 8% (Stages 1+2, $978/t spodumene; Firefinch DFS Update Dec 2021) — comparable as reported.
Kabanga
Tanzania · Ni
US$1,579m
@ 8%
US$1,579m issuer 8%Already 8% — comparable as reported.
Ewoyaa
Ghana · Li
US$1,500m
@ 8%
US$1,500m issuer 8%Already 8% — comparable as reported.
Kasiya
Malawi · rutile+graphite
US$1,065–1,448m
@ 8%
US$1,065–1,448m issuer 8%Already 8%; post-tax range (Malawian fiscal terms unresolved).
Balama
Mozambique · graphite
US$1,125m
@ 10%
US$1,376m Derived · re-discountedRe-discounted 10%->8%; STILL on 2015-FS pricing — rate normalised, vintage not.
Motheo
Botswana · Cu
US$206m
@ 7%
US$195m Derived · re-discountedRe-discounted 7%->8%.
Kamoa-Kakula
DRC · Cu
@ scenario set
excludedDRC, data-layer-only scenario range — not reduced to a comparable point.
Lindi Jumbo
Tanzania · graphite
US$197m
@ 10% (NPV10)
US$231m Derived · re-discountedRe-discounted 10%→8% (level annuity over 24-yr mine life, anchored to issuer NPV10=197); isolates the rate effect only, 2019 price vintage uncorrected.
Koné
Côte d'Ivoire · Au
US$1,089m
@ 5% · $1,850/oz base
≤US$889m Derived · upper bound
@ $1,850/oz deck — not cross-comparable · level-annuity (overstates ~6%)
Re-discounted 5%→8% (level annuity, 16-yr life) from Jan-2024 UFS base NPV₅ $1,089m @ $1,850/oz. Price NOT normalised — own DFS deck. FISCAL: UFS predates the new 5–8% (8% above $2,000/oz) Côte d'Ivoire royalty from Jan-2025 — government take understated.
Doropo
Côte d'Ivoire · Au
US$1,457m
@ 5% · $3,000/oz base
US$1,160m Derived · issuer rate-table
@ $3,000/oz deck — not cross-comparable
8% interpolated from the issuer's OWN discount-rate sensitivity ($1,245m@7%, $988m@10%; DFS Table 2) — the level-annuity proxy would read ~$1,228m, ~6% high. Price NOT normalised — own DFS deck (high base). FISCAL: new royalty 8% above $2,000/oz (5–8% sliding) from Jan-2025. Dec-2025 DFS a priori should apply 8%, but an implied-royalty cross-check (~$420M lifetime royalties+social on ~$6.6bn LOM rev ≈ ~6%) hints at the prior band — if so this NPV is OPTIMISTIC. Royalty basis UNRESOLVED.
Assafou
Côte d'Ivoire · Au
US$2,059m
@ 5% · $2,500/oz base
≤US$1,682m Derived · upper bound
@ $2,500/oz deck — not cross-comparable · level-annuity (overstates ~6%)
Re-discounted 5%→8% (level annuity, 16-yr life) from 23-Apr-2026 DFS base NPV₅ $2,059m @ $2,500/oz (Endeavour headline $2.1bn). Price NOT normalised — own DFS deck. FISCAL: the DFS EXPLICITLY applies 8% above $2,000/oz — incorporation confirmed.
Method. npv8_common_usd_m re-states each issuer NPV to a single 8% basis. Where the issuer publishes a discount-rate sensitivity (Doropo), 8% is interpolated from it; otherwise a level-annuity proxy is used, which Doropo's issuer table shows OVERSTATES NPV₈ by ~6% for pre-production assets — those figures are upper bounds. Method: the issuer cash flow is treated as a level annuity over mine life (the platform DCF's steady-state basis); the implied level free cash flow is backed out from the issuer NPV at the issuer's rate (reproducing it exactly), then re-discounted to 8%. state='Sourced' where the issuer already reported at 8%; state='Derived' where re-discounted (Motheo 7%->8%, Balama 10%->8%). This isolates the discount-rate effect only — it is NOT a full cash-flow rebuild, real profiles ramp and decline, and it does NOT correct price vintage (e.g. Balama remains on 2015-FS pricing; Goulamina on $978/t). Lindi-Jumbo and Kamoa are excluded (unverified rate / DRC range).

Normalising the discount rate does not fix price vintage or study stage. Balama's figure remains on 2015-FS pricing; Goulamina's is Stages 1+2 at US$978/t spodumene (pre-decline); Kasiya is a post-tax range pending Malawian fiscal terms. Read the per-asset basis. Full issuer parameters sit in the structured feed at /api/v1/bankability.json.

Ownership & licence integrity context. The risk-adjusted discount-rate framework (Methodology §10.4) defines the country-risk premium π_c as IC-composite-derived. The ownership & licence integrity read is qualitative country-risk context that sits alongside this layer — it is not a published component of the §10.4 π_c derivation, and it applies no numeric adjustment to the discount rate. Any future incorporation would be specified in the methodology first. Province Scores are unaffected.
Fiscal terms & government take — now part of this screen. Bankability is not just the project NPV; it is how that value splits between investor and state. The deterministic government-take estimator sits behind this view — enter a project's economics and a regime, and it returns royalty, corporate tax and state free-carried equity, with the government/investor split. The statutory regimes below power it. These are statutory defaults — no asset necessarily pays them: the actual outcome is governed by the negotiated mining convention, which is why fiscal stability (whether those terms can change mid-life) matters as much as the headline rate.
JurisdictionHeadline royaltyCITState participationFiscal stability
Côte d'Ivoire
Koné · Doropo · Assafou
Gold 5–8% sliding (8% above $2,000/oz)25%10% free-carried + up to 15% participatingdid not hold industry-wide stability-clause resistance failed; the revised gold royalty (top-band 8% above $2,000/oz) enforced Dec 2025, backdated to Jan 2025
Mali
Goulamina
Gold progressive 3%→7%25% → 30% (2023 Code)up to 30% (10% free + 20% purchasable) + 5% localremoved 2023 Mining Code applies to existing projects at renewal
Tanzania
Kabanga · Lindi Jumbo
Gold 6% · nickel 6% · graphite 3%30%min 16% non-dilutable; up to 50% via tax-for-equitylimited resource-nationalism regime since 2017
DR Congo
Kamoa-Kakula · data-layer only
Copper 3.5% · cobalt 10% · gold 3.5%30%10% non-dilutable + 5% per renewalcut 10→5 yrs new terms apply to existing holders (Art. 342 bis)
Zambia
seeded
Copper 4–10% sliding on price30%no statutory free-carry; via ZCCM-IH, negotiatedfrequently revised 10+ changes since 2008
Guinea
Kiniero
Gold 3–5% (range, not pinned)30%15% automatic non-dilutable + up to 20% purchasableup to 15 yrs via mining convention
Provenance. Statutory rates (royalty, CIT, state participation) are Sourced to the governing instrument in fiscal-regimes.json, and the high-consequence stability calls carry a dated, named citation (expand "source" on each row) — the Côte d'Ivoire flat-8% enforcement (Reuters, Dec 2025) and the Mali 2023 Mining Code (Barrick settlement, Nov 2025). Effective rates at a given price are Derived; the actual asset-level terms sit in the confidential negotiated convention and are bracketed, not asserted (Absent). Run a project's full take in the estimator ›