| Asset | Operator | Country | Stage | Selection rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Manono | Manono Lithium SAS (Zijin/Cominière); contested by AVZ Minerals | DRC | Construction (Manono Lithium SAS); contested by separate AVZ claim | Subject asset |
| Goulamina | Ganfeng Lithium 65% / Mali state 35% (post-2023 Code) | Mali | Operating since December 2024; Phase 1 506 ktpa SC; Phase 2 to 1 Mtpa | Most direct West African comparable; same 2023 Mining Code framework; operational precedent for state-takedown structure |
| Greenbushes | Talison Lithium (Tianqi 51% / Albemarle 49%; IGO 25% via Tianqi) | Australia | Operating multi-decade; world's premier hard-rock spodumene | Operating Tier-1 reference; lowest-cost spodumene operation globally |
| Pilgangoora | Pilbara Minerals (ASX: PLS) 100% | Australia | Operating; 700-740 ktpa SC FY2025 guidance | Largest tonnage resource (446 Mt); operating cost-curve reference |
| Wodgina | Mineral Resources 50% / Albemarle 50% (MARBL JV); MinRes operates. Nov 2025 POSCO acquired 30% of MinRes' operational lithium business (parent-level entity holding MinRes' 50% Wodgina + 50% Mt Marion stakes), valuing MinRes' aggregate 50% interest in Wodgina + Mt Marion at ~$3.9bn; deal subject to FIRB approval | Australia | Operating; ramping post-FOB-cost reduction | Cost-curve transition reference; FOB cost guidance reducing from A$845/t to A$550/t |
| Mt Marion | Mineral Resources 50% / Ganfeng 50% (MinRes operates); POSCO Nov 2025 deal as above gives POSCO indirect 15% interest at MinRes side | Australia | Operating | Mid-cohort cost reference; 4.2% Li2O concentrate; 166 kt Q2 FY24 |
| Kathleen Valley | Liontown Resources (ASX: LTR) | Australia | Operating from late 2024; first underground lithium mine in WA | Underground operation reference; AISC ~A$651/t; new-build comparable |
| Asset | Total resource | Average grade | Contained LCE | Scale ranking |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Manono | 842 Mt total resource (post Jan 2024 update) | 1.61% Li2O (0.5% cutoff) | 33.4 Mt LCE | Largest hard-rock resource globally |
| Goulamina | 108 Mt M+I + 159.2 Mt Inferred = 267.2 Mt total | 1.37% avg (1.44% M+I; 1.33% Inferred) | 7.14 Mt LCE | Mid-tier West African; ~5× smaller than Manono in LCE |
| Greenbushes | 440 Mt total resource | 1.5% Li2O | ~13.9 Mt LCE (operator-stated comparison) | Premier operating reference; ~2.4× smaller than Manono in LCE |
| Pilgangoora | 446 Mt total resource | 1.28% Li2O | Operator-disclosed; chemistry-implied LCE ~14 Mt (446 × 1.28% × 2.473 LCE conversion) | Largest by tonnage but lower grade; lower-grade-but-larger-tonnage profile |
| Wodgina | Operator-disclosed in MinRes / Albemarle filings | Operator-disclosed | Operator-disclosed | Mid-tier Australian; specific resource disclosure available in MinRes corporate disclosures |
| Mt Marion | Operator-disclosed in MinRes / Ganfeng filings | Operator-disclosed | Operator-disclosed | Smaller-scale Australian; specific resource disclosure available in MinRes corporate disclosures |
| Kathleen Valley | Operator-disclosed in Liontown Resources DFS | Operator-disclosed | Operator-disclosed | Underground operation; specific resource disclosure available in Liontown DFS public filings |
Three observations on resource positioning:
| Asset | First production | Steady-state run rate | Operating cost (most recent) | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Manono | Q2 2026 commissioning target (Manono Lithium SAS) | ~700 ktpa Phase 1 (operator-stated) | Not directly disclosed | Construction; multi-claim contestation active |
| Goulamina | December 2024 | 506 ktpa SC Phase 1 → 1 Mtpa Phase 2 | Not directly disclosed by Ganfeng (private operator) | Operating; first commercial shipment August 2025; first royalty payment Q3 2025 ($574,748) |
| Greenbushes | Original 1980s; current configuration 2010s | 1.42 Mt SC produced CY24; CGP3 expansion adding 500 ktpa Q4 2025 | FOB cost ~A$338/t (~$220/t); world's lowest-cost spodumene | Operating; CGP3 capex revised up to A$880M |
| Pilgangoora | 2018 | 700-740 ktpa SC FY2025 guidance (revised down from 800-840 ktpa); Q1 2025 actual 125 kt | Operating cost ~$499/t delivered Q1 2025 | Operating; production challenges from P850→P1000 transition |
| Wodgina | Restart 2022 (after 2019 mothballing) | Multi-train operation | FOB cost reducing A$845/t → A$550/t (Sep 2024 target) | Operating; cost-curve transition |
| Mt Marion | 2017 (current configuration) | 166 kt Q2 FY24 at 4.2% Li2O | ~A$870-970/t (~US$565-630/t per Citi 2024 estimate) | Operating; recently improved to fresh-rock processing |
| Kathleen Valley | Late 2024 | 300+ kt SC over first 11 months (operator-stated) | ~A$651/t AISC (Liontown Sep 2023 forecast) | Operating; ramp-up |
Two structural observations:
| Dimension | Goulamina (Mali, operating reference) | Manono (DRC, contested) |
|---|---|---|
| State stake | Mali state 35% (10% free carry + 25% acquired post-2023 Code) | DRC state stake structure depends on resolution pathway |
| Operator stake | Ganfeng 65% (full Mali Lithium control from July 2025; previously 60%) | Manono Lithium SAS: Zijin ~54.9% per Zijin disclosure; Reuters reports 61% Zijin / 39% Cominière at JV level |
| Royalty structure | 1.5% TPSF royalty held by Lithium Royalty Corp post-Leo Lithium exit (May 2024) | Royalty structure not yet finalised; depends on 2024 implementation decree application |
| Mining license tenure | 30 years initial + 10-year renewal cycles (granted 2019) | Manono Lithium SAS license granted September 2024; AVZ contests |
| Operator-state relationship trajectory | Ganfeng acquired Leo Lithium 40% for $342.7M (May 2024); Mali 35% state acquisition completed July 2025 | State-engagement trajectory contested via active ICSID arbitration |
| Production timing post-mining-license | Construction 2022 → first production Dec 2024 (~5.5 years) | Mining license granted Sept 2024; commissioning target Q2 2026 (~21 months — very fast) |
Goulamina's operational arc tells a senior reader what the 2023 Mali Mining Code framework actually delivers when ALL parties accept the terms: a competent Chinese strategic operator (Ganfeng) builds in ~5.5 years from feasibility to first production, the state takes 35% via the 10% free carry + 25% acquired stake, and a TPSF royalty structure provides cashflow exposure for non-equity holders. Goulamina is the empirical answer to "how does the 2023 Code function operationally."
Manono's contestation arc is structurally different: there is no agreed operator-state framework that all parties accept. The Manono Lithium SAS (Zijin/Cominière) framework was constructed on the premise that AVZ's prior tenure had lapsed; the AVZ ICSID arbitration disputes that premise. Until ICSID rules, neither the Goulamina-style operational pattern nor any alternative pattern can be applied. Goulamina's data illuminates the geological-and-commercial case for Manono but cannot illuminate the contestation-resolution-and-timing question.
| Asset | DFI mandate-fit | Capital sources actually deployed |
|---|---|---|
| Manono | DFI-INELIGIBLE under disputed-tenure exclusion until ICSID resolution | Sovereign-strategic (Zijin operating; CATH conditional Jan 2026); private-strategic (KoBold conditional May 2025) |
| Goulamina | Available; not used. Ganfeng deployed parent-balance-sheet financing | Ganfeng parent balance sheet ($342.7M Leo Lithium acquisition); Mali state co-investment |
| Greenbushes | Not relevant; operating cash flow funds expansion (CGP3 A$880M from internal cashflow) | Talison JV cashflow; Tianqi/Albemarle/IGO equity; CGP3 funded internally |
| Pilgangoora | Not relevant; ASX-listed equity-funded | Pilbara Minerals balance sheet; equity raises |
| Wodgina | Not relevant; MinRes balance sheet | Mineral Resources balance sheet; Albemarle JV (pre-2025) |
| Mt Marion | Not relevant | MinRes/Ganfeng JV cashflow |
| Kathleen Valley | Limited; LG Energy Solution offtake-linked debt | Liontown debt + offtake-linked finance + equity |
No major hard-rock lithium asset has been DFI-debt-financed. The cohort is structurally private-strategic (Chinese balance-sheet for Goulamina/Mt Marion; Australian listed-equity for Pilgangoora/Wodgina/Kathleen Valley) plus offtake-linked debt where applicable. Manono's DFI-ineligibility is therefore not a Manono-specific issue but a hard-rock-lithium-asset-class pattern: even uncontested assets in stable jurisdictions don't typically clear DFI mandate-fit because lithium-price volatility and project-finance-untested deposit structures push DFIs toward more conservative commodity choices (copper, cobalt, nickel for energy transition).
The implication for Manono screening: even if AVZ's ICSID arbitration resolves favourably and Manono becomes structurally eligible for DFI debt, the realistic capital-source pathway remains private-strategic — Chinese, Korean, Japanese, or US strategic capital with end-use offtake interest — plus possibly equity-side institutional capital (sovereign wealth funds, pension funds with extractives mandate). DFI debt is structurally available post-resolution but is not the binding-constraint capital source for hard-rock lithium developments.
Three dimensions on which Manono has no peer-set comparable: