Loulo-Gounkoto — Comparable Asset Benchmarking

The peer set — selection rationale

Production scale and grade — where Loulo-Gounkoto sits structurally

Production and grade analysis

Three observations on positioning:

1. Loulo-Gounkoto's ~4 g/t reserves grade is materially above the African gold cohort. Sukari, Tasiast, Geita, and Iduapriem all operate at sub-3 g/t grades typical of large-tonnage open-pit gold operations. Loulo-Gounkoto's grade — driven by Yalea, Gara, and Gounkoto underground orebodies plus Faraba open pit growth — is closer to Obuasi (high-grade Ghanaian underground) and Kibali (high-grade DRC). The grade-driven cost competitiveness of the asset is structurally distinct from the open-pit cohort.
2. Pre-suspension Loulo-Gounkoto was a top-3 African gold producer. 723 koz 2024 placed it ahead of Sukari (~454-481 koz) and competitive with Tasiast (~622 koz). The post-settlement 2026 guidance of ~290 koz attributable represents the recovery trajectory; full normalisation in 2027-2028 should restore Loulo-Gounkoto to top-3 African producer status.
3. The DR Congo Africa-top-gold-producer ranking shifts (per Ecofin Agency Feb 2026) reflect the Loulo-Gounkoto disruption. With Loulo suspended through 2025 and only resuming late-Dec 2025, DRC overtook Ghana as Africa's top gold producer ranking shift. The structural reading: Loulo-Gounkoto's 12-month suspension materially reshaped Africa's gold-production geography. Recovery to pre-suspension trajectory will substantially restore prior ranking.

Cost positioning — AISC across operating peers

Cost positioning analysis

Loulo-Gounkoto's grade-driven cost positioning is structurally first-quartile-eligible at full operational maturity — the asset's ~4 g/t reserves grade and underground-plus-open-pit configuration is closer to Obuasi (high-grade underground) than to Sukari (lower-grade open-pit). Asset-level AISC is institutionally observable via Barrick Mining Corporation FY disclosures; this overlay does not assert a specific historic point figure.

Post-settlement royalty change (10% under 2023 Code, see Benchmark Spread Metric 4) adds approximately $30M/yr in additional state royalty payment. At ~290 koz 2026 attributable, that's ~$103/oz incremental AISC; at steady-state ~400 koz attributable, ~$75/oz. The cost impact is real but not catastrophic relative to the asset's grade-driven cushion.

Post-disruption recovery patterns — closest single peer is Tasiast

Post-disruption recovery analysis

The Tasiast comparable is structurally informative for Loulo-Gounkoto's recovery trajectory: a major operator (Kinross) experienced multi-year operational disruption and disputes, recovered to operational stability through expansion-plus-resolution, and now operates at ~500 koz/yr — below original-design capacity but operationally stable. The pattern translates to Loulo-Gounkoto: Barrick's recovery trajectory should deliver operational stability at materially reduced production vs 2024 actual but at a sustainable level.

The structural difference: Tasiast's disruptions were operational-and-fiscal; Loulo-Gounkoto's were sovereign-political with criminal-charge dimensions. The settlement framework restoring operational control is structurally similar to Tasiast's VAT-dispute resolution but at materially larger scale (>$1.4bn aggregate impact for Loulo-Gounkoto vs Tasiast's hundreds-of-millions class).

DFI mandate-fit positioning across the peer set

DFI mandate-fit reading

No major operating African gold mine in the peer set is DFI-debt-financed. The cohort is structurally major-operator-balance-sheet plus operator-state framework. Loulo-Gounkoto's DFI-mandate-fit limitation is therefore an asset-class pattern, not a Loulo-specific issue. The realistic capital-source pathway for the asset is:

1. Barrick parent balance sheet for sustaining capex and operational cashflow
2. Gold-streaming counterparties (Franco-Nevada, Wheaton, Triple Flag, Royal Gold) for upfront cashflow against future production at agreed gold-stream economics — Barrick's August 2025 Kansanshi $625M re-acquisition transaction provides a comparable streaming valuation reference
3. Royalty counterparties for direct revenue exposure
4. Equity-side institutional capital (sovereign-wealth, pension, infrastructure funds with extractives mandate) at the Barrick parent level rather than asset level

Where Loulo-Gounkoto is structurally distinct

Three dimensions on which Loulo-Gounkoto has limited or no peer-set comparable:

1. Tier-1 grade in West African open-pit-and-underground configuration. Most West African gold majors are sub-3 g/t open-pit operations; Loulo-Gounkoto's ~4 g/t reserves grade is closer to East African (Geita) or Ghanaian high-grade underground (Obuasi). The grade-driven cost cushion is structurally distinct.
2. Settlement-resolved sovereign-political disruption at $1.4bn-class aggregate cost. Tasiast's disruption was operational-fiscal at smaller scale; Kibali's disruption (M23 conflict adjacency) is geopolitical; no peer experienced a >$1bn-class settlement-resolved sovereign-political disruption with criminal-charge dimension at this scale.
3. Operator-as-counterweight to sovereign aggression. Barrick's willingness to suspend operations for 12 months, write down $1.04bn, pursue ICSID arbitration, and ultimately settle at >$1.4bn-class aggregate cost demonstrated operator-side resolve that may itself shape future Mali and West African operator-state negotiations. The peer set has no equivalent recent example.

What this benchmarking does NOT do

• It does not predict gold prices or attributable cash flow trajectories. The peer set illuminates structural positioning; specific revenue and cash flow modelling is institutional credit memo work.
• It does not validate operator-disclosed cost or capex figures by independent technical work. All peer figures are operator-disclosed; institutional users requiring independent verification commission their own technical-review work.
• It does not produce sovereign credit analysis on Mali, Mauritania, DRC, Egypt, Ghana, or Tanzania. Country composite at /methodology/ provides a screening composite; institutional sovereign-credit work remains the institution's own.
• It does not predict the trajectory of state-operator relationships in any peer jurisdiction. Each is its own political-economy environment.
• It does not include proprietary cost-curve subscription content. Wood Mackenzie, S&P Global Mines, and similar remain the established subscription providers; the platform engages with their content only via public-disclosed citations.